NOTES TO CHAPTER IX.

1. The loss of the battle of Bull Run was undoubtedly severely felt, but there is no reason why we should hesitate to say that the North richly deserved its punishment. The military authorities were perfectly right in setting their faces against the popular demand for an advance with the three months militia, whose term of service had nearly run out, and the three years volunteers, whose military experience had scarcely begun. Nothing could have been gained, of any permanent importance, even if the engagement had turned in our favor. We were utterly unprepared to follow up any advantage.[1] On the other hand, by running, without any useful object, the chance of failure in battle, we gave the new Confederacy an opportunity to plume itself on the superior valor of its soldiers, and to show itself in a proud and conquering attitude before the nations of Europe.

2. McDowell's plan of operations has received great praise from several authorities,[2] but their commendations are obviously made for the purpose of

[1] "In the next few days," says McDowell in his Report,—2

W. 11., 325,
—'* day by clay, I should have lost 10,000 of the best armed, drilled, officered and disciplined troops in the army."

[9] SwinUm, 51, 52, 58; I <"!:mite de Paris, 228; Johnston's *Narrative* 57; I Sherman's *Memoirs* 181 ; Nicolay's *Outbreak* 206.